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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce the issue of finding solutions to the stable matching problem that
are robust to errors in the input and we obtain the first algorithmic results on this topic. In
the process, we also initiate work on a new structural question concerning the stable matching
problem, namely finding relationships between the lattices of solutions of two “nearby” instances.
Our main algorithmic result is the following: We identify a polynomially large class of errors,
D, that can be introduced in a stable matching instance. Given an instance A of stable matching,
let B be the instance that results after introducing one error from D, chosen via a discrete
probability distribution. The problem is to find a stable matching for A that maximizes the
probability of being stable for B as well. Via new structural properties of the type described in
the question stated above, we give a polynomial time algorithm for this problem.
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1 Introduction
Ever since its introduction in the seminal 1962 paper of Gale and Shapley [3], the stable
matching problem has been the subject of intense study from numerous different angles
in many fields, including computer science, mathematics, operations research, economics
and game theory, e.g., see the books [9, 6, 11]. The very first matching-based market,
namely matching medical interns to hospitals, was built around this problem, e.g., see [6, 12].
Eventually, this led to an entire inter-disciplinary field, namely matching and market design
[12]. The stable matching problem and market design were the subject of the 2012 Nobel
Prize in Economics, awarded to Roth and Shapley [13].
The current paper initiates the study of this problem from yet another angle, namely
robustness to errors in the input. To the best of our knowledge, this issue has not been
studied in the context of this problem (see also Section 1.2) even though the design of
algorithms that produce robust solutions is already a very well established field, especially as
pertaining to robust optimization, e.g., see the books [2, 1].
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A particularly impressive aspect of the stable matching problem is its deep and pristine
combinatorial structure. This in turn has led to efficient algorithms for numerous questions
studied about this problem, e.g., see the books mentioned above. A second major contribution
of our paper is initiating work on a new structural question, namely finding relationships
between the lattices of solutions of two “nearby” instances. In the current paper, and our
followup work [10], we restrict ourselves to “nearby” instances which differ in only one
agent’s preference list. Clearly, this is only the tip of the iceberg as far as “nearby” instances
go. Moreover, the structural results are so clean and extensive that they are likely to find
algorithmic applications beyond the problem of finding robust solutions. In particular, with
ever more interesting matching-based markets being designed and launched on the Internet
[12], these new structural properties could find interesting applications and are worth studying
further.
We will introduce the problem of finding robust stable matchings via the following model:
Alice has an instance A of the stable matching problem, over n boys and n girls, which she
sends it to Bob over a channel that can introduce errors. Let B denote the instance received
by Bob. Let D denote a polynomial sized domain from which errors are introduced by the
channel; we will assume that the channel introduces at most one error from D. We are also
given the discrete probability distribution, p over D, from which the channel picks one error.
In addition, Alice sends to Bob a matching, M , of her choice, that is stable for instance A.
Since M consists of only O(n) numbers of O(logn) bits each, as opposed to A which requires
O(n2) numbers, Alice is able to send it over an error-free channel. Now Alice wants to pick
M in such a way that it has the highest probability of being stable in the instance received
by Bob. Hence she picks M from the set
arg max
N
{Prp[N is stable for instance B | N is stable for instance A]},
We will say that such a matching M is robust. We seek a polynomial time algorithm for
finding such a matching.
Clearly, the domain of errors, D, will have to be well chosen to solve this problem.
A natural set of errors is simple swaps, under which the positions of two adjacent boys
in a girl’s list, or two adjacent girls in a boy’s list, are interchanged. We will consider a
generalization of this class of errors, which we call shift. For a girl g, assume her preference
list in instance A is {. . . , b1, b2, . . . , bk, b, . . .}. Move up the position of b so g’s list becomes
{. . . , b, b1, b2, . . . , bk, . . .}, and let B denote the resulting instance. Then we will say that B is
obtained from A by a shift. An analogous operation is defined on a boy b’s list. The domain
D consists of all such shifts; clearly, D is polynomially bounded. We prove the following
theorem.
I Theorem 1. There is a polynomial time algorithm which given an instance A of the stable
matching problem and a probability distribution p over the domain, D, of errors defined above,
finds a robust stable matching in A.
1.1 Overview of results and technical ideas
We first summarize some well-known structural facts, e.g., see [6]. The set of stable matchings
of an instance form a distributive lattice: given two stable matchings M and M ′, their meet
and join involve taking, for each boy, the optimal or pessimal choice, respectively. It is easy
to show that the resulting two matchings are also stable. The extreme matchings of this
lattice are called boy optimal and girl-optimal matchings. A deep notion about this lattice
is that of a rotation. A rotation, on an ordered list of k boy-girl pairs, when applied to a
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matching M in which all these boy-girl pairs are matched to each other, matches each boy
to the next girl on the list, closing the list under rotation. The k pairs and the order among
them are so chosen that the resulting matching is also stable; moreover, a rotation on a
subset of these k pairs, under any ordering, leads to a matching that is not stable. Hence,
a rotation can be viewed as a minimal change to the current matching that results in a
stable matching. Rotations help traverse the lattice from the boy-optimal to the girl-optimal
matching along all possible paths available.
For the given instance, a partial order Π is defined on a subset of rotations; the closed
sets of Π are in one-to-one correspondence with the set of stable matchings of the instance.
Moreover, if S is such a closed set, then starting in the lattice from the boy-optimal matching
and applying the rotations in set S, we reach the stable matching corresponding to S.
Let A and B be two instances of stable matching over n boys and n girls, with sets of
stable matchingsMA andMB , respectively, and lattices LA and LB , respectively. Then, it
is easy to see that the matchings inMA ∩MB form a sublattice in each of the two lattices.
Next assume that instance B results from applying a shift operation, defined above, to
instance A. Then, we show thatMAB =MA \MB is also a sublattice of LA. We use this
fact crucially to show that there is at most one rotation, ρin, that leads fromMA ∩MB to
MAB and at most one rotation, ρout that leads from MAB toMA ∩MB. Moreover, we
can obtain efficiently this pair of rotations for each of the polynomially many instances that
result from the polynomially many shifts.
It is easy to see that a matching M corresponding to a closed set S is stable in instance
B iff whenever ρin ∈ S, ρout ∈ S. We next give an integer program whose optimal solution
is a robust stable matching for the given probability distribution on shifts. The IP has
one indicator variable, yρ, corresponding to each rotation ρ in Π. The constraints of the
program ensure that the set S of rotations that are set to 0 form a closed set. The rest of the
constraints and the objective function ensure that the corresponding matching maximizes
the probability that it is stable in the erroneous instance B. Finally, we show that the
LP-relaxation of this IP always has integral solutions. Hence we obtain a polynomial time
algorithm for finding a robust stable matching.
1.2 A matter of nomenclature
Assigning correct nomenclature to a new issue under investigation is clearly critical for ease
of comprehension. In this context we wish to mention that very recently, Genc et. al. [4]
defined the notion of an (a, b)-supermatch as follows: this is a stable matching in which if any
a pairs break up, then it is possible to match them all off by changing the partners of at most
b other pairs, so the resulting matching is also stable. They showed that it is NP-hard to
decide if there is an (a, b)-supermatch. They also gave a polynomial time algorithm for a very
restricted version of this problem, namely given a stable matching and a number b, decide
if it is a (1, b)-supermatch. Observe that since the given instance may have exponentially
many stable matchings, this does not yield a polynomial time algorithm even for deciding if
there is a stable matching which is a (1, b)-supermatch for a given b.
Genc. et. al. [5] also went on to defining the notion of the most robust stable matching,
namely a (1, b)-supermatch where b is minimum. We would like to point out that “robust”
is a misnomer in this situation and that the name “fault-tolerant” is more appropriate. In
the literature, the latter is used to describe a system which continues to operate even in
the event of failures and the former is used to describe a system which is able to cope with
erroneous inputs, e.g., see the following pages from Wikipedia [15, 14].
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 The stable matching problem
The stable matching problem takes as input a set of boys B = {b1, b2, . . . , bn} and a set
of girls G = {g1, g2, . . . , gn}; each person has a complete preference ranking over the set
of opposite sex. The notation bi <g bj indicates that girl g strictly prefers bj to bi in her
preference list. Similarly, gi <b gj indicates that the boy b strictly prefers gj to gi in his list.
A matching M is a one-to-one correspondence between B and G. For each pair bg ∈M ,
b is called the partner of g in M (or M -partner) and vice versa. For a matching M , we
say that b is above (or below) g if he prefers his M -partner to g (or g to his M -partner).
Similarly, g is said to be above (or below) b if she prefers her M -partner to b (or b to her
M -partner). For a matching M , a pair bg 6∈M is said to be blocking if b is below g and g is
below b, i.e., they prefer each other to their partners. A matching M is stable if there is no
blocking pair in M .
2.2 The lattice of stable matchings
Let M and M ′ be two stable matchings. We say that M dominates M ′, denoted by M M ′,
if every boy weakly prefers his partner in M to M ′. It is well known that the dominance
partial order over the set of stable matchings forms a distributive lattice [6], with meet and
join defined as follows. The meet of M and M ′, M ∧M ′, is defined to be the matching
that results when each boy chooses his more preferred partner from M and M ′; it is easy to
show that this matching is also stable. The join of M and M ′, M ∨M ′, is defined to be
the matching that results when each boy chooses his less preferred partner from M and M ′;
this matching is also stable. These operations distribute, i.e., given three stable matchings
M,M ′,M ′′,
M ∨ (M ′ ∧M ′′) = (M ∨M ′)∧ (M ∨M ′′) and M ∧ (M ′ ∨M ′′) = (M ∧M ′)∨ (M ∧M ′′).
It is easy to see that the lattice must contain a matching, M0, that dominates all others
and a matching Mz that is dominated by all others. M0 is called the boy-optimal matching,
since in it, each boy is matched to his most favorite girl among all stable matchings. This is
also the girl-pessimal matching. Similarly, Mz is the boy-pessimal or girl-optimal matching.
2.3 Rotations help traverse the lattice
A crucial ingredient needed to understand the structure of stable matchings is the notion of
a rotation, which was defined by Irving [7] and studied in detail in [8]. A rotation takes r
matched pairs in a fixed order, say {b0g0, b1g1, . . . , br−1gr−1} and “cyclically” changes the
mates of these 2r agents, as defined below, to arrive at another stable matching. Furthermore,
it represents a minimal set of pairings with this property, i.e, if a cyclic change is applied on
any subset of these r pairs, with any ordering, then the resulting matching has a blocking
pair and is not stable. After rotation, the boys’ mates weakly worsen and the girls’ mates
weakly improve. Thus one can traverse from M0 to Mz by applying a suitable sequence of
rotations (specified by the rotation poset defined below). Indeed, this is precisely the purpose
of rotations.
Let M be a stable matching. For a boy b let sM (b) denote the first girl g on b’s list such
that g strictly prefers b to her M -partner. Let nextM (b) denote the partner in M of girl
sM (b). A rotation ρ exposed in M is an ordered list of pairs {b0g0, b1g1, . . . , br−1gr−1} such
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that for each i, 0 ≤ i ≤ r− 1, bi+1 is nextM (bi), where i+ 1 is taken modulo r. In this paper,
we assume that the subscript is taken modulo r whenever we mention a rotation. Notice
that a rotation is cyclic and the sequence of pairs can be rotated. M/ρ is defined to be a
matching in which each boy not in a pair of ρ stays matched to the same girl and each boy
bi in ρ is matched to gi+1 = sM (bi). It can be proven that M/ρ is also a stable matching.
The transformation from M to M/ρ is called the elimination of ρ from M .
Let ρ = {b0g0, b1g1, . . . , br−1gr−1} be a rotation. For 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1, we say that ρ moves
bi from gi to gi+1, and moves gi from bi to bi−1. If g is either gi or is strictly between gi
and gi+1 in bi’s list, then we say that ρ moves bi below g. Similarly, ρ moves gi above b if b
is bi or between bi and bi−1 in gi’s list.
2.4 The rotation poset
A rotation ρ′ is said to precede (or dominate) another rotation ρ, denoted by ρ′ ≺ ρ, if ρ′
is eliminated in every sequence of eliminations from M0 to a stable matching in which ρ is
exposed. Thus, the set of rotations forms a partial order via this precedence relationship.
The partial order on rotations is called rotation poset and denoted by Π.
I Lemma 2 ([6], Lemma 3.2.1). For any boy b and girl g, there is at most one rotation that
moves b to g, b below g, or g above b. Moreover, if ρ1 moves b to g and ρ2 moves b from g
then ρ1 ≺ ρ2.
A closed subset is a subset of the poset such that if an element is in the subset then all
of its predecessors are also included. There is a one-to-one relationship between the stable
matchings and the closed subsets of Π. Given a closed subset C, the correponding matching
M is found by eliminating the rotations starting from M0 according to the topological
ordering of the elements in the subset. We say that C generates M .
I Lemma 3 ([6], Lemma 3.3.2). Π contains O(n2) rotations and can be computed in polyno-
mial time.
I Lemma 4 ([6], Theorem 2.5.4). Every rotation appears exactly once in any sequence of
elimination from M0 to Mz.
2.5 The notion of shift
In this paper, we will assume that a girl applies a shift to one of her preferences as defined
below. We will study the structural properties of the resulting instance B.
Let the preference list of girl g in A be {. . . , b1, b2, . . . , bk, b, . . .}. In B the preference list
of g is {. . . , b, b1, b2, . . . , bk, . . .}. Moreover, all other preference lists are identical in both A
and B. We say that B obtained from A by applying a shift. We denote x <Iz y if z prefers y
to x in instance I.
3 Structural Results
3.1 The stable matchings in MA \ MB form a sublattice
LetMA andMB be the sets of all stable matchings under instance A and B respectively.
Let MAB = MA \ MB. In other words, MAB is the set of stable matchings in A that
become unstable in B. In this section we show thatMAB forms a lattice. We first prove a
simple observation.
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I Lemma 5. Let M ∈MAB. The only blocking pair of M under instance B is bg.
Proof. Since M 6∈ MB , there must be a blocking pair xy 6∈M under B. Assume xy is not
bg, we will show that xy must also be a blocking pair in A. Let y′ be the partner of x and
x′ be the partner of y in M . Since xy is a blocking pair in B, x >By x′ and y >Bx y′. The
preference list of x remain unchanged from A to B, so y >Ax y′. Next, we consider two cases:
If y is not g, the preference list of y does not change. Therefore, x >Ay x′, and hence, xy
is also a blocking pair in A.
If y is g, for all pairs x, x′ such that x >By x′ and x 6= b, we also have x >Ay x′. Therefore,
xy is a blocking pair in A.
This contradicts the fact that M is stable under A. J
Recall that b1 ≥g b2 ≥g . . . ≥g bk are k boys right above b in g’s list such that the position
of b is shifted up to be above b1 in B. From Lemma 5, we can then characterize the set
MAB .
I Lemma 6. MAB is the set of all stable matchings in A that match g to a partner between
b1 and bk in g’s list, and match b to a partner below g in b’s list.
Proof. Assume M is a stable matching in A that contains big for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and bg′ such
that g >b g′. In B, g prefers b to bi, and hence bg is a blocking pair. Therefore, M is not
stable under B and M ∈MAB .
To prove the other direction, let M be a matching inMAB . By Lemma 5, bg is the only
blocking pair of M in B. For that to happen, pM (b) <Bb g and pM (g) <Bg b. We will show
that pM (g) = bi for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Assume not, then pM (g) <Bg bk, and hence, pM (g) <Ag b.
Therefore, bg is a blocking pair in A, which is a contradiction. J
Let LA be the boy-optimal lattice formed byMA.
I Theorem 7. MAB forms a sublattice of LA.
Proof. AssumeMAB is not empty. LetM1 andM2 be two matchings inMAB . By Lemma 6,
M1 and M2 both match g to a partner between b1 and bk in g’s list, and match b to a partner
below g in b’s list. Since M1 ∧M2 is the matching resulting from having each boy choose
the more preferred partner and each girl choose the least preferred partner, M1 ∧M2 also
belongs to the set characterized by Lemma 6. A similar argument can be applied to the case
of M1 ∨M2. ThereforeMAB form a sublattice of LA. J
3.2 Rotations going into and out of a sublattice
Let M be a stable matching in MA and ρ be a rotation exposed in M with respect to
instance A. If M 6∈ S and M/ρ ∈ S for a set S, we say that ρ goes into S. Similarly, if
M ∈ S and M/ρ 6∈ S, we say that ρ goes out of S. Let the set of all rotations going into S
and out of S be IS and OS , respectively.
Let {bi1 , . . . bil} be the set of possible partners of g in any stable matching in MAB,
where 1 ≤ i1 ≤ . . . ≤ il ≤ k. Let ρ1 be a rotation moving g to bil , ρ2 be the rotation moving
b below g and ρ3 be a rotation moving g from bi1 . Note that each of ρ1, ρ2 and ρ3 might not
exist.
I Lemma 8. IMAB can only contain ρ1, ρ2. OMAB can only contain ρ3.
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Proof. Consider a rotation ρ ∈ IMAB . There existsM ∈MA\MAB such thatM/ρ ∈MAB .
By Lemma 6, M/ρ matches g to a partner between b1 and bk in g’s list, and matches b to
a partner below g in b’s list. Moreover, M either does not contain big for any 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
or contains bg′ where g′ ≥b g, or both. If M does not contain big for any 1 ≤ i ≤ k, then
ρ = ρ1. If M contains bg′ where g′ ≥b g, then ρ = ρ2.
Consider a rotation ρ ∈ OMAB . There exists M ∈MAB such that M/ρ ∈MA \MAB.
Again, by Lemma 6, M contains big for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and bg′ where g′ <b g. Since M dominates
M/ρ in the boy optimal lattice, b must prefer g′ to his partner in M/ρ. Hence, M/ρ matches
b to a partner below g in b’s list. Therefore, M/ρ must not contain big for any 1 ≤ i ≤ k. It
follows that ρ must be ρ3. J
I Lemma 9. If both ρ1 and ρ2 exist then ρ1  ρ2.
Proof. Assume that ρ1 6= ρ2 and there exists a sequence of rotation eliminations, from M0
to a stable matching M in which ρ2 is exposed, that does not contain ρ1. Since ρ2 moves b
below g, g is matched a partner higher than b in her list in M/ρ2. Therefore, the partner
can only be bil or a boy higher than bil in g’s list.
Consider any sequence of rotation eliminations from M/ρ to Mz. In the sequence, the
position of g’s partner can only go higher in her list. Therefore, ρ1 cannot be exposed in any
matching in the sequence. It follows that ρ1 is not exposed in a sequence of eliminations
from M0 to Mz, which is a contradiction by Lemma 4. J
I Theorem 10. There is at most one rotation in IMAB and at most one rotation in OMAB .
Moreover, the rotation in IMAB must be either ρ1 or ρ2, and the rotation in OMAB must be
ρ3.
Proof. By Lemma 8, IMAB can contain at most 2 rotations, namely ρ1 and ρ2 if they are
distinct. By Lemma 9, if both of them exist, ρ1  ρ2. Hence, IMAB can contain at most one
rotation, and it is either ρ1 or ρ2.
Again, by Lemma 8, OMAB can contain at most one rotation, namely ρ3 if it exists. J
By Theorem 10, there is at most one rotation ρin coming into MAB and at most one
rotation ρout coming out ofMAB .
I Proposition 11. ρin and ρout can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Since we can compute ΠA efficiently according to Lemma 3, each of ρ1, ρ2 and ρ3
can be computed efficiently.
First we can check possible partners of b and g with respect to instance A. By Lemma 6,
MAB is empty if none of the possible partners of g is between b1 and bk in g’s list or none of
the partners of b is below g in b’s list. It follows that both ρin and ρout do not exist. Hence
we may assume that such a case does not happen.
Suppose ρ2 exists. If ρ3 exists and ρ3  ρ2,MAB = ∅. Otherwise, ρin = ρ2, and ρout = ρ3
if ρ3 exists.
Suppose ρ2 does not exist. If ρ1 exists, ρin = ρ1. If ρ3 exists, ρout = ρ3. J
I Lemma 12. Let M be a matching in MAB and S be the corresponding closed subset in
ΠA. If ρ1 exists, S must contain ρ1. If ρ2 exists, S must contain ρ2. If ρ3 exists, S must
not contain ρ3.
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Proof. If ρ1 exists, M0 does not contain big for any i ∈ [1, k]. Since M ∈MAB , by Lemma 6
M matches g to a boy between b1 and bk in her list. The set of rotations eliminated from
M0 to M must include ρ1.
If ρ2 exists, b can not be below g in M0. Since b is below g in M , by Lemma 6 the set of
rotations eliminated from M0 to M must include ρ2.
Assume that ρ3 exists and S contains ρ3. Since ρ3 moves g up from bi1 , M can not
contain big for any i ∈ [1, k]. This is a contradiction. J
3.3 The rotation poset for the sublattice MAB
From the previous section we know that MAB is a sublattice of MA. In this section we give
the rotation poset that generates all stable matchings in the sublattices.
We may assume that MAB 6= ∅. If ρin exists, let Πin = {ρ ∈ ΠA : ρ  ρin} and Mboy
be the matching generated by Πin. Otherwise, let Mboy = M0. Similarly, let Mgirl be the
matching generated by ΠA \ Πout, where Πout = {ρ ∈ ΠA : ρ  ρout}, if ρout exists, and
Mgirl = Mz otherwise.
I Lemma 13. Mboy is the boy-optimal matching in MAB, and Mgirl is the girl-optimal
matching inMAB.
Proof. Let M be a matching inMAB generated by a closed subset S ⊆ ΠA. By Lemma 12,
if ρin exists, S must contain ρin. Since Πin is the minimum set containing ρin, Πin ⊆ S.
Therefore, Mboy M .
To prove that M Mgirl, we show S ⊆ ΠA \Πout. Assume otherwise, then there exists a
rotation ρ ∈ S such that ρ 6∈ ΠA \Πout. It follows that ρ ∈ Πout, and hence ρ  ρout. Since
S contains ρ and S is a closed subset, S must also contain ρout. This is a contradiction by
Lemma 12. J
I Theorem 14. ΠAB = ΠA \ (Πin ∪Πout) is the rotation poset generatingMAB.
Proof. LetM be a matching inMAB generated by a closed subset S ⊆ ΠA. Let S′ = S \Πin.
We show that S′ is a closed subset of ΠAB and eliminating the rotations in S′ starting from
Mboy according to the topological ordering of the elements gives M .
First S′ ∩ Πin = ∅ trivially. Since M ∈ MAB, S does not contain ρout by Lemma 12.
Therefore, S′ does not contain ρout, and S′ ∩Πout = ∅. It follows that S′ is a closed subset
of ΠAB .
Next observe that we can eliminate rotations in S from M0 by eliminating rotations in
Πin first and then eliminating rotations in S \ Πin. This can be done because Πin is a closed
subset of ΠA. Since Πin generates M , the lemma follows. J
4 Algorithm for finding a robust stable matching
We now use the structural properties described in Section 3 to give a polynomial time
algorithm for finding a robust stable matching. Clearly, the results in Section 3 can be
reproduced when we make a shift in a boy’s list. Recall from Section 1 that given a discrete
probability distribution D on all possible shifts, a robust stable matching is a stable matching
M ∈MA that minimizes the probability that M ∈MAB , where B ∼ D.
For a shift B, let ρBin and ρBout be the rotation going intoMAB and out ofMAB respectively.
By Proposition 11, ρBin and ρBout can be computed efficiently for each B.
By Lemma 3, ΠA can be computed in polynomial time. We create two additional vertices,
a source s and a sink t. For a shift B, we may ignore the cases where neither ρBin nor ρBout
exist. In those cases, either MA = MB or MA ∩MB = ∅. Hence, assume that such an
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instance B does not exist, andMAB is always a proper non-empty subset of MA. For a
shift B such that ρBin does not exist, let ρBin = s. Similarly, for a shift B such that ρBout does
not exist, let ρBout = t.






s.t. yρ1 ≤ yρ2 ∀ρ1, ρ2 : ρ1 ≺ ρ2
yt = 1
ys = 0
xB ≥ yρBout − yρBin ∀B
xB ≥ 0 ∀B
yρ ∈ {0, 1} ∀ρ ∈ ΠA.
(IP)
I Lemma 15. (IP) gives a solution to a robust stable matching.
Proof. Let S = {ρ : yρ = 0}. The set of constraints:
yρ1 ≤ yρ2 ∀ρ1, ρ2 : ρ1 ≺ ρ2
guarantees that S is a closed subset.
Notice that xB = 1 if and only if yρBout = 1 and yρBin = 0. This, in turn, happens if and
only if the matching generated by S is inMAB .
Therefore, by minimizing
∑
e∈E xBpB , we can find a closed subset that generates a robust
stable matching. J
I Lemma 16. (IP) can be solved in polynomial time.
Proof. Consider relaxing the constraint yρ ∈ {0, 1} to 0 ≤ yρ ≤ 1. We show how to round
a solution of this natural LP-relaxation of (IP) to have an integral solution of the same
objective function. It suffices to just consider y as xB will always be set to max(0, yρBout−yρBin)
for any given y.
Let y be a fractional optimal solution of the relaxation. Let 1 = a0 > a1 > a2 > . . . >
ak > ak+1 = 0 be all the possible y-values. Since y is fractional, k ≥ 1. Denote Si by the set
of all rotations having y-value equal to ai, where 1 > ai > 0.
Let B+ be the set of instances B such that:
xB = yρBout − yρBin > 0.
yρBout = ai.
yρBin 6= ai.
Let B− be the set of instances B such that:
xB = yρBout − yρBin > 0.
yρBin = ai.
yρBout 6= ai.
Consider perturbing the y-value of all rotations in Sa by a small amount ε:
yρ ← yρ + ε = ai + ε ∀ρ ∈ Sa.
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B∈B− pB = 0, we can choose ε = ai−1 − ai and obtain another optimal
solution where the value of k decreases by 1. Keep going until k = 0 gives an integral
solution. J
Finally, Theorem 1 follows from Lemmas 15 and 16.
5 Discussion
As stated in the Introduction, the two main questions on stable matching introduced in this
paper are obtaining efficient algorithms for finding solutions that are robust to errors in the
input, and the structural question of finding relationships between the lattices of solutions of
two “nearby” instances. The current paper and our followup work [10] seem to suggest that
both these issues are likely to lead to much work in the future. In particular, the structural
results are so clean and extensive that they are likely to find algorithmic applications beyond
the problem of finding robust solutions. One possible domain of applications that may be
able to exploit these structural properties is matching-based markets, particularly as we are
seeing ever more interesting such markets being designed and launched on the Internet, e.g.,
see [12].
At a more detailed level, the domain D, for which we have obtained our algorithm, is
very restrictive and we need to extend it to a larger domain. Our followup paper [10] does
this, though it seems more can be done. In particular, are there ways of dealing with two or
more errors? Another interesting question is to improve the running time of our algorithm.
This looks also quite plausible.
Beyond these questions, pertaining to the most basic of formulations of stable matching,
one can study numerous variants and generalizations, such as incomplete preference lists, the
stable roommates problem, and matching intern couples to hospitals. Each of these bring
their own structural properties and challenges, e.g., see [6, 11].
References
1 A. Ben-Tal, L. El Ghaoui, and A.S. Nemirovski. Robust Optimization. Princeton Series in
Applied Mathematics. Princeton University Press, October 2009.
2 G. C. Calafiore and L. El Ghaoui. On distributionally robust chance-constrained linear
programs. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 130(1), 2006.
3 David Gale and Lloyd S Shapley. College admissions and the stability of marriage. The
American Mathematical Monthly, 69(1):9–15, 1962.
4 Begum Genc, Mohamed Siala, Barry O’Sullivan, and Gilles Simonin. Finding robust solu-
tions to stable marriage. arXiv preprint arXiv:1705.09218, 2017.
T. Mai and V. V. Vazirani 60:11
5 Begum Genc, Mohamed Siala, Gilles Simonin, and Barry O’Sullivan. On the complexity of
robust stable marriage. In International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and
Applications, pages 441–448. Springer, 2017.
6 Dan Gusfield and Robert W Irving. The stable marriage problem: structure and algorithms.
MIT press, 1989.
7 Robert W Irving. An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem. Journal of
Algorithms, 6(4):577–595, 1985.
8 Robert W Irving and Paul Leather. The complexity of counting stable marriages. SIAM
Journal on Computing, 15(3):655–667, 1986.
9 Donald Ervin Knuth. Stable marriage and its relation to other combinatorial problems:
An introduction to the mathematical analysis of algorithms. American Mathematical Soc.,
1997.
10 Tung Mai and Vijay V. Vazirani. A generalization of Birkhoff’s theorem for distributive
lattices, with applications to robust stable matchings. In arXiv, 2018.
11 David Manlove. Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences. World Scientific, 2013.
12 Alvin E. Roth. Al Roth’s game theory, experimental economics, and market design page,
2016. URL: http://stanford.edu/~alroth/alroth.html#MarketDesign.
13 Alvin E. Roth and Lloyd S. Shapley. The 2012 Nobel Prize in Economics, 2012. URL:
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2012/.
14 Wikipedia. Fault Tolerence. URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fault_tolerance.
15 Wikipedia. Robustness (Computer Science). URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Robustness_(computer_science).
ESA 2018
